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Abstract
We propose a contextual bandit based model to capture the learning and social
welfare goals of a web platform in the presence of myopic users. By using payments
to incentivize these agents to explore different items/recommendations, we show
how the platform can learn the inherent attributes of items and achieve a sublinear
regret while maximizing cumulative social welfare. We also calculate theoretical
bounds on the cumulative costs of incentivization to the platform. Unlike previ-
ous works in this domain, we consider contexts to be completely adversarial, and
the behavior of the adversary is unknown to the platform. Our approach can im-
prove various engagement metrics of users on e-commerce stores, recommendation
engines and matching platforms.
1 Introduction
In several practical applications such as recommendation systems (mobile health apps,
Netflix, Amazon product recommendations) and matching platforms (Uber, Taskrabbit,
Upwork, Airbnb), the platform/firm has to learn various system parameters to optimize
resource allocation while only partially being able to control learning rates. This is
because, the users who transact on such platforms can take autonomous actions that
maximize their own utility based on potentially inaccurate information, sometimes to
the detriment of the learning goals.
It is well known that users are influenced by the ratings and reviews of previous
users provided by the platform while making their purchase decisions on e-commerce
platforms. While the platform can reveal such attributes of different items it sells, a
myopic user’s decision based on these attributes can be sub-optimal if attributes have not
been learned well enough from previous transactions. Because of the positive feedback
loop, the platform’s estimates of these attributes may be very different from their true
values, leading to loss of social welfare. While users are myopic, the platform tends to
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be long-term focused, and has to incentivise its users through discounts, promotions and
other controls to learn these attributes accurately and increase the overall social welfare.
Similarly in the area of mobile health apps (e.g., for chronic care management, fitness
& general health, medication management) incentivization in learning can help the app
serve users better, but might get impeded by users being immediate reward focused.
Here, the platform typically sends recommendations for users to partake in activities
with the goal of improved health outcomes [5]. The quality of recommendations can
be high if the platform knows the utility model of the users and their preferences for
different activities. To learn these preferences, the platform could devise incentives to
nudge the user to prefer a different activity than their currently preferred choice, where
the latter is based on current low quality recommendations. If it can restrict the amount
of nudging while still being able to learn enough to give good activity recommendations
(based on what it has learned so far), then all users will be better off.
In the above two applications and many others, the platform’s goal is to maximize
social welfare of the myopic users by learning the system parameters just enough to
make the best recommendations (or equivalently, ensuring that the users take the best
actions for their contexts) over time, when compared to the clairvoyant benchmark of
making recommendations when the system parameters are known. The paper focuses on
modeling a principal-agent variation of online learning in the contextual bandit setting
that allows the platform (principal) to use payments as auxiliary controls. Typically,
the platform needs to give payments (which are costly) since in most practical settings
the choices of the users based on current data may not be exploratory enough. Our
objective then is to design such payments schemes that allow learning and improving
social welfare, while simultaneously not costing too much to the platform.
Contextual bandits, a popular framework to learn and maximize revenue in online
advertising and recommendation domains [13, 2, 17], are problems where users are
modeled as contexts (feature vectors) and the learner picks an action tailored to the
context for which it is rewarded (bandit feedback). The methods developed here learn
the parameters of the reward generation model while simultaneously exploiting current
information on the quality of the arms (popular algorithms include EXP4, -greedy,
RegCB etc). While limited in their expressivity compared to Markov Decision Processes
(MDPs) (there are no states), they tend to capture learning problems where the reward
for an action (such as purchasing an item or walking for 10 minutes or standing up)
has an immediate outcome (such as a positive utility or a better mood) fairly accurately.
While MDPs are also a suitable approach, they are typically harder to learn and analyse
theoretically.
Only a few works have considered the principal-agent variations which involves
incentivization in learning through payments or otherwise in the recent past. In [3] show
that a constant amount of payments is enough if the users are heterogeneous, however,
in their setting the platform is aware of the arriving contexts and the distribution from
which contexts are drawn. The role of user heterogeneity is further explored in [1] and
[11] as covariate diversity. In the former work, the authors consider contexts to be
stochastic and prove that myopic arm selection is enough for certain distributions of
contexts when the number of arms is two, while in the later, the authors use controlled
and known perturbations to the contexts and show that greedy (myopic) selection of
arms gives sub-linear regret. In [10], the authors propose a randomized algorithm
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without an explicit user heterogeneity criteria. However, their technique requires use of
ridge estimator to estimate arm attributes leading to unbiassed estimates.
A related but orthogonal approach is pursued in [15, 16, 4, 9], where the authors
consider principal-agent settings but only allow the use of information asymmetry under
incentive compatibility constraints to explore, unlike payments in our setting. A similar
setting was also investigated in [8] where they explore various unbiased disclosure
policies that the platform can use to explore. In [7] the authors also consider a principal-
agent setting, and assuming that the principal knows the distribution from which the
contexts arrive as well as that each arm is preferred by at least some contexts, provide
regret and payment bounds for an incentivization algorithm (building on their earlier
results in [6]). In a vanilla multi-armed bandit setting, the authors in [18] have studied
how payments can help explore and achieve sublinear regret.
Main contributions: First, we propose a contextual bandit based principal-agent
model where payments can be used as auxiliary controls to induce exploration and
learning. Second, we develop qualitative and quantitative characterization of payments
as means of ensuring exploratory behaviour by agents. We develop a novel algorithm and
show that the expected aggregate payments it makes in such regimes is sub-linear in the
time horizon T . Finally, we compare regret performance and payments requirements of
our approach and other competitors on both synthetic and real datasets. We find that the
greedy approach with no payments (i.e., the platform does not explore at all) work well
with real data, however, there are synthetic data instances where its regret performance
is consistently surpassed by algorithms such as ours. Our proposed algorithm works
with the most general agent behavior (adversarial contexts), moreover, the payments
scheme does not require the principal to have the knowledge of the current context (see
section 2).
2 Problem Statement
Users (or agents) arrive sequentially over a period T on a platform V and make choices.
The context vector corresponding to an agent arriving at time step t ∈ [T ] is represented
as θt ∈ Rd (w.l.o.g. assume ‖θt‖2 ≤ 1). Each choice is represented as an arm i ∈ N
(with |N | = N ), which is associated with a fixed d-dimensional attribute vector µi
(w.l.o.g. assume ‖µi‖2 ≤ 1). We can think of each coordinate of µi as an attribute of
arm i that may influence the user to choose it over the others. True arms attributes are
unknown to both platform and the agents a priori, and the platform shows its estimate of
these attributes to arriving agents.
User choice and reward model: The user choice behavior is myopic in nature: she
is presented with the empirical estimates of {µi}i∈N : {µˆi}i∈N , corresponding to the
arms available on the platform (e.g., via metadata, tags or auxiliary textual information)
and then she makes a singleton choice. In this notation, µˆti denotes the latest estimate
for the arm i available at the time t. She may have a random utility for each arm i,
whose mean is θt.µi (an inner product), where θt is her context vector. Given these
utilities, she picks an arm with the highest perceived utility. In the special case where
there is no randomness in the utilities, then her decision is simply argmaxj∈N θt.µˆj .
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For simplicity, we will work under this restriction for the rest of the paper. Let the
chosen arm be denoted as it at round t. The reward accrued by the user is θt.µit .
Feedback model: Although the platform keeps track of all interaction history, it can
only observe the context after the agent has arrived on the platform. The platform com-
putes and displays the empirical estimates {µˆi}i∈N based on the measurements it is able
to make. The measurements include the context of the user that arrived and the random
utility that she obtained: yt = θt.µit + ηt, where ηt is a zero mean i.i.d. sub-Gaussian
noise random variable. The platform estimates {µˆi}i∈N by using the observed contexts
and the reward signals for each arm at each time step, most often by solving a regression
problem. Some useful notations are as follows: Θ is the T × d-dimensional design
matrix whose rows are the contexts θt. Also ∀i ∈ N , Si,t := {s < t|is = i}. Further,
Θ(Si,t) represents the design matrix corresponding to the contexts arriving at the time
steps denoted by Si,t, and Y (Si,t) denotes the collection of rewards corresponding to
these contexts at time steps Si,t.
Learning objective: The platform incurs an instantaneous regret rt if the arm picked
by the user is not the best arm for that user. That is, rt = maxj θt.µj − θt.µit . The
goal of the platform is to reduce the expected cumulative regret RT = E[
∑T
t=1 rt]
over the horizon T . Intuitively, if the platform had the knowledge and could display
the true attributes of the arms, then the users would pick the items that are best suited
to them, and the cumulative regret would be zero. But since the platform does not
know the attributes of the arms a priori and the users are acting myopically, it has to
incentivise some of these users to explore (based on the history of contexts and rewards
generated thus far). The platform does so by displaying a payment/discount vector
pt in addition to the estimated arm attributes. The corresponding user’s decision is
argmaxj∈N (θt.µˆj + p
t
j). The goal of the platform is to design incentivization schemes
that minimize the cumulative regret, while keeping the total payments made as small as
possible. We assume all ties to be broken arbitrarily. Hence at each round t, an agent
with context θt (unknown to the platform when it is deciding payments) arrives on the
platform. The platform presents the agent with arm estimates {µˆi}i∈N and a payment
vector pt. The agent makes a singleton choice, thereby accruing some reward. The
platform observes the context and a noisy measurement of this reward, and updates its
estimates.
3 Algorithms and Guarantees
In this section, we propose a new algorithm (CBWHETEROGENIETY, see Algorithm
1) that uses randomized payments to incentivize agents, enabling the platform to incur
sub-linear regret. Essentially we identify a way to adapt and extend the non principal-
agent setting of [11] to our platform-user interaction model. One way to reduce the
cost that the platform incurs towards incentivization is to work with a special class of
contexts (those having covariate diversity, see Definition 3.1), which would provide
exploration of the arms naturally, leading to learning and low-regret. More specifically,
in the contextual bandit setting of [11], the authors assume that a known perturbation
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(i.i.d. noise) is added to the contexts before they are picked up by the platform. They
show that because of this perturbation the power of adversary (in choosing the contexts)
is reduced and a myopic selection of arms enjoys sublinear regret (Theorem 3.1).
In our setting, the choice of context at a given round is purely adversarial and
we make no assumption on the contexts. Our key idea is to use payments to mimic
perturbations. We show that with the proposed payment scheme, covariate diversity
can be infused into our model, even if the arriving contexts are adversarial. Finally, we
bound the expected cumulative payments in our scheme and show that it is sub-linear in
T .
Our algorithm CBWHETEROGENIETY is described in Alg. 1. The key idea is to
first generate perturbations that can satisfy the covariate diversity condition, and then
transform these perturbations to a payment vector, which is then presented to the user.
The user then myopically picks the best action, given these payments (one for each
arm), ensuring fair compensation if this choice was different from their original choice.
The platform updates the estimates of the selected arm’s attribute vector by performing
a regression while taking the payment information into account. As we show below,
this approach enjoys sublinear (in horizon T ) upper bounds on regret and the payment
budget.
Input: Arms: N , time horizon: T , and initial exploration parameter: m.
InitialExploration()
for t = m+ 1 to T do
Agent with context θt arrive at the Platform.
{pti}i∈N = CalcPayment().
Agent choose arm pit = arg maxi(µˆti.θt + p
t
i).
UpdateEstimate()
end
Procedure CalcPayment()
pti = ζt.µˆ
t
i, where ζt ∼ N (0, σ2Id) for all arms.
Procedure UpdateEstimate()
Updating History:
Θ(Spit,t+1) = [Θ(Spit,t)|(θt + ζt)] with ζt obtained above, and
Y (Spit,t+1) = [Y (Spit,t)|(µˆpit .θt + ptpit)].
Updating Parameter:
µˆt+1pit = (Θ(Spit,t)
TΘ(Spit,t))
−1Θ(Spit,t)
TY (Spit,t).
Algorithm 1: CBWHETEROGENIETY
Lemma 3.1. In CBWHETEROGENIETY (Algorithm 1), there exists a suitable payment
for each arm such that arg maxi(µˆti.θt + p
t
i) = arg maxi µˆ
t
i.(θ
◦
t ) for all t > m (m is
the number of initial forced exploration rounds). And θ◦t satisfies covariate diversity
(Definition 3.1). Additionally, expected payments made by the platform are sub-linear
in horizon T , specifically the average cumulative payments are O
(
N
√
2T log(NT )
)
.
Proof. First, we make some observations. The platform can offer negative payments
implying users would incur some penalty if they select certain actions. Hence, the
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platform can influence the choice of the myopic user by providing a collection of
payments and penalties (one for each arm). Enforcing payments as: pti = ζt.µˆ
t
i where
ζt ∼ N (0, σ2Id), ensures that the perceived context, θt + ζt at any given round t
satisfies the covariate diversity condition. Hence, in the proposed payments scheme, the
platform pays a random payments vector pt where each arm may receive a non-zero
value, depending on the estimates µˆt.
The cumulative payments for an arm i can be expressed as:
Payment(T, i) =
T∑
t=1
ζt.µˆ
t
it , (1)
Notice that, ζt.µˆti is a sum of sub-Gaussian random variables as ζt.µˆ
t
i =
∑d
l=1 ζ
(l)
t .µˆ
(l),t
i .
Hence ζt.µˆti is a sub-Gaussian random variable with the variance-proxy parameter, ||µˆti||.
Since we assume that ||µi|| ≤ 1, estimate (in our algorithm) ||µˆti|| ≤ 1 as well. Thus we
can use sub-Gaussian tail bounds to upper bound the absolute value of the payments in
Eq. (1). Consider the following standard tail bound for sub-Gaussian random variable:
Lemma 3.2. Let Y1, Y2..Yt be an s-sub-Gaussian martingale, i.e, each Yj is distributed
as mean-0 and s-sub-Gaussian conditioned on Y1, ..Yj−1. Then:
P
 t∑
j=1
Yj <
√
2ts log(1/δ)
 > 1− δ
Thus we bound the sum
∑T
t=1 ζt.µˆ
t
it
with probability at least 1−δ with the quantity:
T∑
t=1
ζt.µˆ
t
it <
√
2T log(1/δ). (2)
In Eq (2), we apply a union bound to obtain a bound for all arms i ∈ N simultaneously
with probability 1− δ′, as shown below:
T∑
t=1
ζt.µˆ
t
it <
√
2T log(N/δ′)
Hence, the cumulative payments across all arms is upper bounded by:
N∑
i=1
Payments(T, i) < N
√
2T log(N/δ′),
with probability at least 1− δ′. To realize the final bound we use δ′ = 1/T .
We now provide a proof of the regret claim. First, we re-write the definition of
covariate diversity from [11] as below.
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Definition 3.1. For any distribution D with ζ ∼ D and ζ ∈ Rd and θ◦t := θt + ζ , for
any arbitrary θt ∈ Rd such that: (a) if ζ is a "centrally bounded", i.e. w.ζ ≤ r , ∀w :
||w|| ≤ 1 with high probability, and (b) if the minimum eigenvalue of the expected outer
product E[θ◦t .(θ◦t )T ] is lower bounded, i.e:
λmin
[
E
[
θ◦t .(θ
◦
t )
T
]] ≥ λ◦,
then, the perturbed context, θ◦t has covariate diversity.
Remark 3.1. In the Algorithm 1, an agent makes a choice after receiving the payment
vector from the platform and hence to the platform, the perceived context θ◦t has
Gaussian ("centrally bounded" distribution) perturbation baked-in providing co-variate
diversity to the context. Such a condition on the context implies that there is non-trivial
variance in all dimensions and intuitively such an arrangement allows convergence of
the least square estimator of arm attributes.
Since (a) the payments scheme proposed in the proof of Lemma 3.1 establishes
covariate diversity, and (b) in the Algorithm 1, we update history with perturbed
contexts, it is intuitive to see that the regret upper bound of Theorem 4.1 of [11] (derived
in the non principal-agent setting) also applies here.
Theorem 3.1. With an appropriate initial exploration (parameterized by m), CB-
WHETEROGENIETY has the following regret upper bound with probability at least
1− δ′′:
R(T ) ≤ O˜
(√
TN log (TN)
3/2
)
,
where the notation O˜(.) hides dependence on instance specific parameters and δ′′.
Remark 3.2. Note that for the regret guarantee to hold, Algorithm 1 must have an
initial exploration phase, during which the agents are made to play arms uniformly at
random or in a round-robin fashion. Intuitively, this warm-start is required to build up
robustness of estimates against adversarial contexts.
3.1 Other Payments scheme and Lower Bound
In the previous section, we established a payments scheme with bounded cumulative cost
to the platform that also allowed for sub-linear regret without any additional assumption
on the the instance or the adversarial choice of the contexts. It is natural to ask the
following question: does there exist a payments scheme which is even more frugal
for the platform (i.e., costs less) and still ensures sub-linear regret? Could there be
a principal-agent setting where initial exploration is not needed? The first question
has been partially addressed before. In [3], the authors show that only a constant (in
T ) total amount of payment is required for a sub-linear regret bound. However, in
their model the platform knows the distribution of the contexts as well as views the
context of the arriving agent before deciding on the payments, this is in addition to the
heterogeneity assumption on the contexts, which is equivalent to the covariate diversity
described above. In [10], the authors presents a randomized algorithm which does not
need any initial exploration phase as the exploration is baked-into the randomization.
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Their scheme, however requires that the agents and the platform maintain the estimate
of the arm attributes using a ridge estimator.
In the previous section and in the above works, cumulative payment scales up with
instance parameters. We claim that, this is essential if we ought to perform better than a
vanilla explore-then-commit strategy1, as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3. Consider A to be the set of all explore-then-commit algorithms (without
incentivization) for the contextual bandit that does not make any addition assumptions
on the instance or the contexts. With a restricted upper cap B on the cumulative
payments budget, no algorithm can do better than the best algorithm in the set A even
with an initial exploration.
Proof. Firstly, we make an observation that the best algorithm (denoted by Alg) in the
set A: it has the best regret guarantee of all algorithms that do not explicitly incentivize
by payments and have an initial exploration phase. Consider an instance with two
arms and let t be the first round after the initial exploration phase. Let µˆ1 and µˆ2
be the corresponding estimates of the arm attributes, visible to the arriving agents
on the platform. As the agent arrival is purely adversarial, ∃ context θ′, such that
(µˆ1 − µˆ2) · θ′ > B. Further, if the adversary opts for this context for all the following
rounds till T , then incentivizing through payments is fruitless. This is because, the fixed
budget B is too less to induce any change to the myopic behavior of the agents. Hence,
in fixed budget regimes, Alg has the best regret guarantee.
4 Simulations
In this section we compare the learning performance (regret) and payment requirements
for our proposed strategy Algorithm 1 and other standard baselines for both synthetic
and real datasets. For ease of referencing we name the algorithms as: (1) CBWHETERO-
GENIETY (Algorithm 1); (2) CBWPAYMENTS (an algorithm in which the platform
provides as much payment as required so that the myopic agents choose arms as if they
are deploying LinUCB [14]); (3) CBCHAINEDUNRESTRICTED (an algorithm based
on the chaining method of [10]); (4) CBCHAINEDRESTRICTED (an instance of the
algorithm CBCHAINEDUNRESTRICTEDwith a fixed upper cap on the total cumulative
payments) and (5) NOPAYMENTS (the platform is passive and agents make myopic
choice without any influence).
In our first experiment, the contexts are drawn from a multivariate Gaussian distri-
bution with a non-zero mean. We set the number of arms to be |N | = 8, the context
dimension as d = 4, and the time horizon as T = 800, while averaging over 10 Monte
Carlo runs (refer to Fig 1). The NOPAYMENTS strategy, i.e., where the platform has
no control on exploration, perform very well and has a sub-linear regret. However, in
our simulation studies its performance was consistently surpassed by other algorithms,
especially CBWPAYMENTS with LinUCB as the underlying strategy. One interesting
result (which is also observed in the next experiment) is that CBWHETEROGENIETY has
good performance in terms of payments required to ensure sub-linear regret. This
1In a typical explore-then-commit learning strategy, there is an initial pure exploration phase by the end of
which the learner commits to a single best action till the end of the horizon T [12]
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Figure 1: Left plot shows cumulative regret, right shows the total payments made by various
algorithms. In both plots, x-axis is the time horizon and y-axis represents either cumulative regret
or cumulative payments made.
Figure 2: Left plot shows the cumulative regret, right shows the total payments made by various
algorithms. In both, x-axis is the time horizon and y-axis represents either cumulative regret or
cumulative total payments.
reinforces our theoretical guarantees for the same (see Lemma 3.1, where upper bounds
on the expected total payments were stated). On the other hand, LinUCB (imple-
mented within CBWPAYMENTS) incurred large incentivization costs in these synthetic
principal-agent instances.
Next, we use the same experimental setup as before, but use a publicly available
data set to mimic arm attribute learning: the EEG data set from the OpenML platform.
This data set contains 14-dimensional feature vectors with two possible class labels
(|N | = 2). We use this classification instance to generate contexts and assign rewards.
We standardize the feature vectors as a pre-processing step. Taking the time horizon
as T = 2500, we randomize the arrival of contexts and report results averaged over
10 Monte Carlo runs (refer Fig 1). Interestingly, the NOPAYMENTS strategy performs
very well, followed by the payment based schemes (note that our algorithm is quite
competitive in this setting and has regret and payment guarantees while NOPAYMENTS
does not without addtional assumptions).
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the principal-agent variants of online learning under the
contextual bandit framework, where a platform sends recommendations and users act on
those that are most valuable to them, and the platform can use payments to incentivize
exploration and fasten learning.
This paper is among only a handful of recent works which have tackled the the
problem of incentivization/recommendation in principal-agent settings, hence several
fruitful avenues for extending this initial foray remain.
• In Algorithm 1, platform uses payments to infuse heterogeneity in the arriving
contexts. It is easy to ensure sub-linear regret with Ω(T ) payments. Similarly,
if the allowed regret is upto O(T ), the platform does not need to pay at all. It
would an interesting problem to calculate lower bounds on payments required for
a reasonable regret guarantee.
• It seems to be the case that notions such as covariate diversity may be necessary
for unbiased estimation of arm attributes. Hence, a study which ties together
the efficacy of various algorithms (including ours) to covariate diversity in the
contexts could be an interesting contribution in the incentivized exploration
literature.
• Although assuming myopic behavior of the agents is an intuitive modeling choice,
it may not cover all the practical possibilities. Hence, extending algorithm design
and analysis to situations where the agents are non-myopic, for instance, they are
anticipating payments, are partially observed, or are governed by a rich discrete
choice model. All these would also be of significant interest.
• More complex user behaviors can modeled if the platform can inform the estimate
of each arm’s attributes along with their variance. This can better inform the users,
especially the ones that are risk-averse.
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